Ethical Commitments by Alfieri, Anthony V.
University of Miami Law School
University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository




University of Miami School of Law, aalfieri@law.miami.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/fac_articles
Part of the Legal Education Commons, Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility Commons,
and the Legal Profession Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty and Deans at University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. For more
information, please contact library@law.miami.edu.
Recommended Citation
Anthony V. Alfieri, Ethical Commitments, 38 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 199 (1996).
ETHICAL COMMITMENTS
ANTHONY V. ALFIERI*
The spirit of collaboration inspiring the W.M. Keck Founda-
tion Forum on the Teaching of Legal Ethics reinvigorated the
historical commitments of many to the development of a signifi-
cant scholarship, pedagogy, and practice of ethics within legal
education and the profession as a whole. Roger Cramton and
Susan Koniak vividly display the strength of that spirit in their
jointly crafted work, Rule, Story, and Commitment in the Teach-
ing of Legal Ethics.' Exceptional scholars of long standing,
Cramton2 and Koniak5 advance a forceful argument in defense
of the curricular integration of rule, story, and commitment in
the context of a legal ethics course. In this Essay, I present a
brief response to their argument, offering a mix of praise, quar-
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1. Roger C. Cramton & Susan P. Koniak, Rule, Story, and Commitment in the
Teaching of Legal Ethics, 38 WM. & MARY L. REv. 145 (1996).
2. See, e.g., Roger C. Cramton, Delivery of Legal Services to Ordinary Americans,
44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 531 (1994); Roger C.iCramton, Individualized Justice, Mass
Torts, and "Settlement Class Actiqns" : An Introduction, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 811
(1995); Roger C. Cramton, The Lawyer As Whistleblower: Confidentiality and the Gov-
ernment Lawyer, 5 GEO. J. LEGAL ETICS 291 (1991); Roger C. Cramton, Mandatory
Pro Bono, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1113 (1991); Roger C. Cramton, Proposed Legislation
Concerning a Lawyer's Duty of Confidentiality, 22 PEPP. L. REV. 1467 (1995); Roger
C. Cramton & Lisa K. Udell, State Ethics Rules and Federal Prosecutors: The Con-
troversies over the Anti-Contact and Subpoena Rules, 53 U. Prrr. L. REv. 291 (1992).
3. See, e.g., Susan P. Koniak, Feasting While the Widow Weeps: Georgine v.
Amchem Products, Inc., 80 CORNELL L. REv. 1045 (1995); Susan P. Koniak, The Law
Between the Bar and the State, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1389 (1992); Susan P. Koniak,
Through the Looking Glass of Ethics and the Wrong with Rights We Find There, 9
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1 (1995); Susan P. Koniak, When Courts Refuse to Frame the
Law and Others Frame It to Their Will, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 1075 (1993).
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rel, and sympathy.
Cramton and Koniak deserve praise for both elegance and
courage. Undaunted by student and faculty skepticism toward
ethics instruction at law school, they skillfully defend the
American Bar Association's (ABA) mandated curricular require-
ment in ethics.4 Enacted during the Watergate era, the ABA
requirement demands that law schools provide "instruction in
the duties and responsibilities of the legal profession."5 Con-
ceived broadly, the instruction encompasses diverse pedagogical
methods.6 To pass muster, however, each method need only
survey the "history, goals, structure and responsibilities of the
legal profession."'
Overcoming the breadth and vagueness of the ABA's substan-
tive requirement, Cramton and Koniak marshal an affirmative
case for formal instruction in the law and ethics of lawyering.'
To make the case for an ethics-teaching requirement, they assert
that effective instruction in the law of lawyering heightens ethi-
cal sensitivity and increases the capacity for reflective moral
judgment.9 Implicit in this assertion is the premise that good
judgment forms the core of moral reasoning. Absent this prem-
ise, a lawyer's moral discretion operates without foundation and
guidance. The effort to link ethics instruction to moral training
signals an intent to cure the antifoundational tendency encour-
aging, and thereby condoning, the exercise of unguided lawyer
discretion in determining client ends and the means to achieve
such ends.
Casting legal ethics as a field of independent moral complexity
doubtlessly promotes the affirmative case for an ethics-teaching
requirement. Although others recognize the moral tensions em-
bedded in the tradition and practice of lawyering,' ° Cramton
4. Cramton & Koniak, supra note 1, at 150-56; see ABA STANDARDS FOR THE AP-
PROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS Standard 302(a)(iv) (1995).
5. ABA STANDARDS FOR THE APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS Standard 302(a)(iv) (1995).
6. See id.
7. Id.
8. See Cramton & Koniak, supra note 1, at 157-64.
9. See id. at 159.
10. See THE GOOD LAWYER: LAWYERS' ROLES AND LAWYERS' ETHICS (David Luban
ed., 1983); DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY (1988).
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and Koniak enhance this appreciation by locating these tensions
within the constraining obligations of courts, third persons, the
public, and the law itself." This contextual treatment of obliga-
tion is significant. By grounding their analysis of ethical obliga-
tion not only in abstract rule, 2 but also in concrete story, 3
Cramton and Koniak encourage an interdisciplinary scholarship
devoted to the study of lawyers and law practice in action. 4 In
this way, they urge rejection of the anti-practice ethos tolerated,
and sometimes espoused, by certain theoretical schools of legal
scholarship. 5 This rejection repudiates the theory/practice di-
chotomy predominant in legal education. 6 The importance of
this repudiation cannot be overstated. Embracing theory and
practice in the investigation of law, lawyering, and legal institu-
tions affords both coherence and insight. The cultivation of
judgment depends on this bridge.
Of course, no acclaim" comes without quarrel. The account that
Cramton and Koniak jointly produce generates both large and
small quarrels. To their credit, such quarrels in part arise out of
a willingness to address the thorny issues of curricular revision
and faculty recruitment that emerge as matters ancillary to the
approval of an ethics-teaching requirement. 7 The small quar-
11. See Cramton & Koniak, supra note 1, at 169-81.
12. See id. at 170-77.
13. See id. at 177-81.
14. For examples of interdisciplinary scholarship devoted to lawyers, see Lawyer-
ing Theory Symposium, 37 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1 (1992); Lawyers As Storytellers &
Storytellers As Lawyers: An Interdisciplinary Symposium Exploring the Use of Story-
telling in the Practice of Law, 18 VT. L. REV. 567 (1994); Symposium, Critical The-
ories and Legal Ethics, 81 GEO. L.J. 2457 (1993); Symposium, The Many Voices of
Clinical Legal Education, 1 CLINICAL L. REV. 1 (1994); Symposium, Race, Gender,
Power, and the Public Interest: Perspectives on Professionalism, 8 ST. THOMAS L.
REV. 1 (1995); Symposium, Speeches from the Emperor's Old Prose: Reexamining the
Language of Law, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1233 (1992); Theoretics of Practice: The Inte-
gration of Progressive Thought and Action, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 717 (1992).
15. Strands of an anti-practice ethos have been discovered in the scholarship of
both the Critical Legal Studies and Critical Race Theory movements. See Guyora
Binder, Beyond Criticism, 55 U. Cal. L. REv. 888 (1988); Leroy D. Clark, A Critique
of Professor Derrick A. Bell's Thesis of the Permanence of Racism and His Strategy of
Confrontation, 73 DENy. U. L. REV. 23, 49-50 & n.148 (1995).
16. For a discussion of the theory/practice dichotomy in legal education, see Bind-
er, supra note 15, at 890-905.
17. Cramton & Koniak, supra note 1, at 149-50, 189-93.
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
rels embody three objections.
Astutely setting out curricular revision as a starting point,
Cramton and Koniak propose that first-year courses assess "some
ethics issues," especially those emphasizing the lawyer's roles in
counseling and negotiation. 8 Rather than find fault with this
proposal, perhaps something broader in coverage might be imag-
ined. Consider, for example, a course examining ethics and the
lawyering process that also combines interviewing, fact investi-
gation, case theory, and the study of advocacy as the pursuit of
civic virtue.'9 Here, the notion of virtue contemplated extends
beyond the conditions of individual moral choice to the circum-
stances of collective moral decision-making. Studying the roots of
civic virtue underlying advocacy uncovers methods of fostering
moral deliberation in the attorney-client relationship."
In a bid to expand the scope of curricular revision, Cramton
and Koniak also propose the pervasive teaching of ethics
throughout the curriculum.2' To be effective, they point out,
pervasive instruction must highlight the contextual nature of
lawyer decision-making under particular institutional arrange-
ments and in light of specific ethical obligations.22 Surely they
are correct in making this observation. Yet, reliance on faculty
commitment and institutional monitoring measures to reach this
overarching goal seems misplaced. The history of faculty indo-
lence and antagonism toward the study of ethics dictates enlist-
ing the support of alumni, the bench, and the bar in shared
curricular development.
Similarly, reliance upon standard faculty selection procedures
to meet wider curricular objectives seems equally misplaced. To
be sure, Cramton and Koniak give apt attention to the protocol
of faculty selection, curricular inclusion, and research support.'
Yet again, standard protocol may be inadequate to accomplish
18. Id. at 166-67.
19. See Heidi L. Feldman, Codes and Virtues: Can Good Lawyers Be Good Ethical
Deliberators?, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 885 (1996).
20. See id. at 904-05.
21. See Cramton & Koniak, supra note 1, at 166-69; DEBORAH L. RHODE, PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONSIBIuTY: ETHICS BY THE PERVASIVE METHOD (1994).
22. See Cramton & Koniak, supra note 1, at 181-89.
23. See id. at 189-92.
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the more fundamental task of recruiting faculty capable of revi-
talizing the often "stock scholarship" and conventional pedagogy
of ethics. Standard protocol regimes, in fact, are more likely to
reproduce, rather than renew or reinvent, accepted academic
practices. Reinventing ethics scholarship and pedagogy requires
the recruitment of faculty dedicated to studying the intersections
of theory and practice in the classroom and in advocacy.
Plainly, these are small quarrels of modest consequence. Pars-
ing some larger quarrels may prove more fruitful. Consider five
objections. For example, at critical points in their analysis,
Cramton and Koniak appear to conflate personal identity and
professional role.' Identity turns on the multiple categories of
race, gender, ethnicity, age, disability, and sexual orientation."
Categorical identification may carry special obligations to a
community" or a cause. In the same way, role commitment
may entail specific obligations to a client, rule, or story." Thus,
though identity and role may overlap in advocacy, divergence
and dissonance seem plausible outcomes as well.
Having conflated identity and rule, Cramton and Koniak seem
to divide narratives by position and function, finding distribu-
tions at the center and at the margins of rule-based story de-
pending upon levels of dissonance. They observe: "At the mar-
gins, narratives embodying one principle will inevitably compete
with conflicting narratives."29 The core-periphery distinction,
albeit attractive and even useful at times, clashes sharply with
the Critical Legal Studies concept of fundamental contradic-
tion"0 and the postmodern notion of immanent tension."'
24. See id. at 159-60, 172-77, 179-81, 186-89, 195-99.
25. See Bill Ong Hing, Raising Personal Identification Issues of Class, Race, Eth-
nicity, Gender, Sexual Orientation, Physical Disability, and Age in Lawyering Cours-
es, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1807 (1993).
26. See Bill Ong Hing, In the Interest of Racial Harmony: Revisiting the Lawyer's
Duty to Work for the Common Good, 47 STAN. L. REV. 901 (1995).
27. See David Wilkins, Two Paths to the Mountaintop? The Role of Legal Education
in Shaping the Values of Black Corporate Lawyers, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1981 (1993).
28. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Mitigation, Mercy, and Delay: The Moral Politics of
Death Penalty Abolitionists, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 325 (1996); Austin Sarat, Nar-
rative Strategy and Death Penalty Advocacy, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 353 (1996).
29. Cramton & Koniak, supra note 1, at 176.
30. See Peter Gabel & Duncan Kennedy, Roll Over Beethoven, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1
(1984); Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFF. L.
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Moving next to methodology, Cramton and Koniak recommend
case analysis of legal ethics over alternative teaching tech-
niques, primarily in deference to the "deep dynamic of legal
education." 2 Deference relegates role-playing, simulations, and
audiovisual materials to a limited place in ethics teaching. The
logic of this hierarchy, according to Cramton and Koniak, rests
on the potency of the case method in nourishing the formation of
prudence and practical judgment among students." To the ex-
tent that prudence demands disengagement, however, it risks
the loss of empathy, a skill essential to ethical decision making
in the important service of rights and virtue.
Simply to laud Cramton and Koniak for their embrace of
rights and virtue-based ethical traditions overlooks the provoca-
tive elements of their account. Their condemnation of "contempo-
rary" jurisprudential movements for a "preoccupation with
'rights',3 4 for example, invites quick rebuke from Critical Race
Theory (CRT) scholars." Likewise, their enchantment with vir-
tue in a community setting omits mention of the experience of
exclusion historically suffered by people of color. CRT scholars
point to this outsider experience of segregation as an enduring
characteristic of community in America. 6
Notwithstanding such quarrels, the project that Cramton and
Koniak undertake evokes sympathy. Indeed, a cluster of themes
central to that project warrant sympathetic extension. Consider
the theme of obligation. Cramton and Koniak seem to reconceive
the field of law and ethics as a body of obligations, rather than
as a bundle of rightsY.3 This intriguing formulation challenges
communitarians to take up and to settle CRT charges of exclu-
REv. 205 (1979).
31. See Symposium, Beyond Critique: Law, Culture, and the Politics of Form, 69
TEx. L. REV. 1595 (1991).
32. Cramton & Koniak, supra note 1, at 178 n.116.
33. Id. at 178-79.
34. Id. at 179.
35. See Symposium, Minority Critiques of the Critical Legal Studies Movement, 22
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 297 (1987).
36. See Wendy Brown-Scott, The Communitarian State: Lawlessness or Law Re-
form for African-Americans?, 107 HARV. L. REv. 1209 (1994); Stephen M. Feldman,
Whose Common Good? Racism in the Political Community, 80 GEO. L.J. 1835 (1992).




A similar reconciliation of meaning must occur in winnowing
out the competing narratives of story that Cramton and Koniak
so deftly reveal.38 Searching for methods of reconciliation in-
volves the consideration of virtue. By "opening up the question of
virtue," 9 Cramton and Koniak implicate the issue of character
and the consequence of role modeling in teaching ethics. Like
Cramton and Koniak, we must renew the value of moral charac-
ter in the classroom. At the same time, we must stand wary of
heroic moral absolutes. This tension is the ultimate import of
Cramton and Koniak's Rule, Story, and Commitment: the dual
commitment to ethical precept and particularized context.
38. See id. at 177-81.
39. Id. at 191.
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